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ALL FOR NOTHING?: EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY 
AND CONGRESSIONAL EVASION ON ARMS SALES 
Margaret M. Murphy+ 
On August 17, 2018, CNN reported that Lockheed Martin manufactured a 
bomb that killed dozens of Yemeni schoolchildren in Northern Yemen.1  Saudi 
Arabia, a leader in the Coalition against the Houthi alliance in Yemen, purchased 
the bomb through an arms deal the State Department sanctioned.2  Michael A. 
Newton, writing for The American Bar Association’s Center for Human Rights 
opined in 2017 that: 
 Given the prima facie evidence of wrongdoing by Saudi Arabia [in 
the conflict in Yemen], continued sale of arms to Saudi Arabia—and 
specifically of arms used in airstrikes—should not be presumed to be 
permissible based on the terms of the A[rms Export Control Act] 
and/or the F[oreign Assistance Act].3 
In the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”), Congress delegates to the 
President the authority “to control the import and the export of defense articles.”4  
While the Act espouses lofty goals for promoting peace and avoiding war, there 
is a question as to the efficacy and validity of its requirements.5  In particular, 
                                                 
 + J.D., The Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law, expected 2021; A.B., Bryn 
Mawr College, 2012.  The author would like to thank Geoffrey Watson for his generous and 
thoughtful suggestions and guidance, her family for their unwavering support, and the Catholic 
University Law Review for its careful work on this comment. 
 1. Nima Elbagir, Salma Abdelaziz, Ryan Browne, Barbara Arvanitidis & Laura Smith-
Spark, Bomb that Killed 40 Children in Yemen was Supplied by the US, CNN (Aug. 17, 2018), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/17/middleeast/us-saudi-yemen-bus-strike-intl/index.html. 
 2. See Oona A. Hathaway et al., Yemen: Is the U.S. Breaking the Law?, 10 HARV. NAT’L 
SEC. J. 1, 5 (2019).  In 2011, under pressure in the wake of Arab Spring protests, Yemen’s 
longstanding leader, Ali Abdullah Saleh, reluctantly stepped down after negotiating immunity for 
himself with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).  Human Rights Council, Situation of Human 
Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014, ANN. REP. OF THE U.N. 
HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. AND REPS. OF THE OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R AND THE SEC’Y-
GEN. 1, 24 (Sept. 9–27, 2019), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ 
A_HRC_42_CRP_1.pdf.  [hereinafter Human Rights Council].  Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, Saleh’s 
vice-president, thereafter prevailed in an uncontested election and assumed the presidency.  Id. at 
25.  The Houthis, a Zaydi Shi’a armed alliance, were not satisfied with this arrangement, and in 
early 2015, reached Sana’a, took control of the presidential palace, and placed Hadi and all his 
senior officials under arrest.  Id. at 2426.  Hadi escaped to the south, and on March 24, 2015 
requested that the GCC and League of Arab states intervene militarily.  Id. 
 3. Michael A. Newton, An Assessment of the Legality of Arms Sales to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia in the Context of the Conflict in Yemen, AM. BAR ASS’N CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. 1, 2223 
(May 19, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/human_rights/ 
ABACHRAssessmentofArmsSalestoSaudiArabia.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 4. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2018). 
 5. See id. 
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emergency waiver provisions authorizing the President to avoid the Act’s 
specific oversight constraints6—together with Supreme Court jurisprudence 
emphasizing executive authority7—complicates what appears to be a clear 
constitutional issue.8 
On May 24, 2019, President Trump invoked an emergency waiver provision 
of the AECA—a clause that allows the President to waive Congressional 
reporting and waiting periods—in order to sell precision-guided munitions to 
Saudi Arabia and its coalition members worth approximately $8 billion.9  
Ordinarily, the AECA requires that the President report to Congress on proposed 
sales, and provide between fifteen and thirty calendar days for Congress to enact 
a joint resolution disapproving the sale.10  However, the President can always 
veto this joint resolution and proceed.11  One senator speculated the President 
invoked the provision because “he kn[ew] Congress would disapprove of this 
sale.”12  Indeed, Congress passed twenty-two joint resolutions opposing this 
particular sale.13 
Given that a War Powers Resolution directing the President to remove U.S. 
troops from hostilities in Yemen garnered sufficient votes to pass both houses, 
despite the fact that support for it could not override a presidential veto, it seems 
possible congressional opposition to future Saudi arms sales could continue to 
grow as well.14  If enough members of Congress are willing to make an issue out 
of arms sales and override a presidential veto, would that matter? 
                                                 
 6. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c)(2) (2018). 
 7. E.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 9. See Scott R. Anderson, Untangling the Yemen Arms Sale Debate, LAWFARE (June 24, 
2019, 1:10 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/untangling-yemen-arms-sales-debate. 
 10. See § 2776(b). 
 11. See Anderson, supra note 9. 
 12. Press Release, Chris Murphy, Murphy Statement on New Middle East Arms Sale, (May 
24, 2019), https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/murphy-statement-on-new-
middle-east-arms-sale.  At Congress’ request, the Office of the Inspector General at the State 
Department delivered initial findings to Senior State Department Officials of an investigation into 
the legality of the use of this provision in early March 2020.  Interview of: Steve A. Linick: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affs., 116th Cong. 29–31 (2020) (statement of Steve A. Linick, 
former State Department Inspector General); Edward Wong & David E. Sanger, State Dept. 
Investigator Fired by Trump had Examined Weapons Sales to Saudis and Emirates, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/18/us/politics/pompeo-trump-linick-inspector-
general-firing.html.  On May 15, 2020, President Trump ousted the Inspector General, Steve A. 
Linick.  Id.; Edward Wong, Michael LaForgia & Lara Jakes, Pompeo Aide who Pushed Saudi Arms 
Sale Said to have Pressured Inspector General, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/us/politics/pompeo-inspector-general-saudi-arms.html.  As 
of June 2020, three congressional committees were investigating whether Linick’s firing was in 
retaliation for inquiries into the Secretary of State he oversaw at that time, one of which concerned 
the use of this emergency waiver provision.  Id. 
 13. Anderson, supra note 9. 
 14. JEREMY M. SHARP & CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD, CONG. RSCH SERV., R45046, 
CONGRESS AND THE WAR IN YEMEN: OVERSIGHT AND LEGISLATION 2015-2019 811 (2019). 
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Diverging from domestic affairs, it seems increasingly more common for the 
President and Congress to employ devices other than those that the framers 
memorialized in the Constitution to manage foreign affairs.15  For example, 
Congress has not issued a declaration of war since World War II.16  Nevertheless, 
courts and scholars have interpreted congressional authorizations of military 
force—like the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks—to sanction the President to engage in war.17  
Instead of entering into treaties with the advice and consent of the senate, 
executive agreements, some of which are sole executive agreements, or those 
that do not require the advice and consent of anyone except for the President, 
have “become the primary instrument of international lawmaking in the United 
States . . . [and] far surpass Article II treaties.”18  The phrase “Executive 
Agreement” does not appear in the Constitution.19  At issue in the case of arms 
sales is whether the rules Congress imposed in the AECA—namely its 
requirement that the President notify Congress, wait for Congress to issue joint 
resolutions in opposition, and halt sales if Congress overrides a President’s 
veto—would actually prevent the President from selling arms.20 
Congress enacted the AECA with the goal of achieving a “world which is free 
from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments; in which 
the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law; and in which 
international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully.”21  
Further, arms sales must be “consistent with the foreign policy interests of the 
United States, the purposes of the foreign assistance program of the United 
States, . . . the extent and character of the military requirement, and the economic 
                                                 
 15. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power over International Law: Restoring the 
Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 150 (2009). 
 16. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Exhuming the Seemingly Moribund Declaration of 
War, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 89, 90 (2008) (“[I]t seems that no nation has issued [declarations of 
war] since World War II.”). 
 17. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Cong. Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2060 (2005) (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 18. Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note 15.  For further criticism of sole executive 
agreements, see Samuel Estreicher & Steven Menashi, Taking Steel Seizure Seriously: The Iran 
Nuclear Agreement and the Separation of Powers, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199, 122627 (2017) 
(“There is, . . . no basis for . . . a pattern of congressional acquiescence . . . creat[ing] a historical 
gloss on the Constitution conferring authority on the President—by political agreement with foreign 
states or other unilateral executive action—to disregard congressional policy . . . in the foreign 
claims settlement arena or another foreign relations context.”). 
 19. See U.S. CONST. art I.  Article I forbids states from entering into “Agreement[s] . . . with 
a foreign Power.”  See also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 40 (1990) (citing U.S. CONST. art I). 
 20. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(1) (2018). 
 21. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2018). 
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and financial capability of the recipient country.”22  Are these requirements 
meaningful? 
Part I of this comment will identify and explore the Constitution’s grants of 
foreign affairs powers to the various branches of government.  It will then 
analyze the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence dealing with these grants; most 
notably, Justice Robert Jackson’s famed Steel Seizure concurrence that provided 
a framework for reconciling balance of power between the Congress and the 
executive.23  Part I will then explore an instance of arms sales past practice: the 
Iran-Contra Affair.  Part II sets out the arguments for and against the President’s 
authority to sell arms over Congress’ opposition and analyzes the role of the 
emergency waiver provisions.  This section applies Justice Jackson’s Steel 
Seizure framework to the question at hand. 
Part III will suggest that the President does not possess the authority to sell 
arms if Congress enacts a joint resolution and overrides a presidential veto 
because the President’s authority is at its lowest, Congress has an affirmative 
grant of authority over arms sales under the Constitution, and as it is much better 
policy for Congress to check the President in this realm, and vice versa.  
Nevertheless, Part III reflects on a larger pattern of imbalance in foreign affairs, 
the complexity the emergency provisions create, and the consequences of 
congressional delegation and avoidance.  It recommends a solution to account 
for constitutional uncertainty the emergency waiver provision creates. 
I.  PRIOR LAW 
A.  Foreign Affairs and War Powers Grants Under the Constitution 
Article I of the United States Constitution grants upon Congress the authority 
“[t]o lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to . . . provide for the 
common Defence . . . of the United States;”24 “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations[;]”25 “[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization[;]”26 “[t]o 
coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin[;]”27 “[t]o define 
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences 
against the Law of Nations;”28 “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and 
                                                 
 22. Id. 
 23. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–39 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 25. Id.  For a discussion of the Foreign Commerce Clause’s original purpose and scope, see 
Scott Sullivan, The Future of the Foreign Commerce Clause, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1955, 1959 
(2015) (noting that, despite the fact that it has received little attention compared to the interstate 
commerce clause, the framers viewed the foreign commerce clause as vital for competing 
economically with Britain). 
 26. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;”29 “[t]o raise 
and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to the Use shall be for a 
longer Term than two Years;”30 “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy;”31 “[t]o 
make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;”32 
‘[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;”33 and “[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”34  In keeping with its separation 
of powers goals, the Constitution did not vest Congress with supreme authority 
in foreign affairs. 
Instead, Article II vests the President with “[t]he executive Power.”35  It 
further provides that he “shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of 
the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, . . . and he shall have 
Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, 
except . . . Impeachment.”36  The President also possesses authority “by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of 
the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice 
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors,”37 to “receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers,”38 and “take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.”39 
B.  The Seesaw of U.S. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the issue was whether an 
export company could be indicted based on a joint resolution of Congress 
delegating to the President the authority to declare certain arms sales unlawful.40  
After first explaining that the matter at hand concerned foreign affairs as 
opposed to domestic, the Court stressed that the nature and character of these 
                                                 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 36. Id. at § 2.  While scholars debate the exact meaning of this power, it is well accepted that 
the phrase conferred “discretion for defensive actions,” meaning that the President had the authority 
to thwart an attack on U.S. borders.  LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN 
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 249–50 (5th ed. 2007) (noting that part of the rationale for 
selecting the word “declare” as opposed to “make” war in Article I was to give the President this 
authority in case Congress was not swiftly able to declare war). 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 38. Id. at § 3. 
 39. Id. 
 40. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 31415 (1936). 
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foreign affairs powers are fundamental[ly] different than domestic affairs.41  The 
Court further explained that the concept of a federal government of limited 
enumerated powers applies only to domestic authority, and not to foreign affairs 
powers.42  The differentiation in powers between domestic authority and foreign 
affairs exists because the federal government assumed the authority of individual 
states with respect to domestic affairs,43  but inherited foreign affairs authority 
from the colonies “in their collective and corporate capacity as the United States 
of America.”44  Therefore the Union, and not individual states under the Articles 
of Confederation “was the sole possessor of external sovereignty.”45  The Court 
reasoned that the United States is a sovereign nation, and its national government 
must possess the same authority to act as any other sovereign would.46  
Concluding that the Congress could delegate authority to the President in the 
area of foreign affairs, the Court remarked, “the investment of the federal 
government with the power of external sovereignty did not depend upon the 
affirmative grants of the Constitution.”47 
In dicta, the Court addressed the President’s specific authority in the foreign 
affairs realm.48  Pronouncing that “the President alone has the power to speak or 
listen as a representative of the nation,” the Court nullified Congress’ role in 
foreign affairs by focusing on the President’s power to negotiate treaties.49  
Indeed, the Court described Congress as “powerless” to interfere with treaty 
negotiation, and quoted Chief Justice Marshall’s statement that “[t]he President 
is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations,” a persona he does not 
                                                 
 41. Id. at 315. 
 42. Id. at 31516. 
 43. Id. at 316. 
 44. Id.  The Court stated, “[a] political society cannot endure without a supreme will 
somewhere.  Sovereignty is never held in suspense.”  Id. at 316–17. 
 45. Id. at 317. 
 46. Id.  Contra THE FEDERALIST NO. 69, at 357 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey & 
James McClellan eds., 2001) (making clear the President’s authority extends to “supreme command 
and direction of the military and naval forces, . . . while that of the British king extends to the 
declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies; all which, by the constitution 
under consideration, would appertain to the legislature.”). 
 47. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318–20.  If this is indeed the case, it begs the question why 
the Framers drafted the Constitution in the first place. 
 48. See id. at 31920. 
 49. Id. at 319.  These particular statements have received much criticism.  Harold Hongju 
Koh stated the following: 
[T]he opinion contains important words of limitation.  By saying that ‘the President alone 
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation,’ Justice Sutherland 
could be read as recognizing only the well-established exclusive presidential power to 
negotiate, and not a novel executive power to conclude agreements, on behalf of the 
United States. 
KOH, supra note 19, at 94.  See also Louis Fisher, The Staying Power of Erroneous Dicta: From 
Curtiss-Wright to Zivotofsky, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 19499 (2016) (highlighting fifty years 
of criticism that scholars have levied against Justice Sutherland and Curtiss-Wright). 
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claim through an act of Congress.50  Citing President Washington’s early 
statement that “[t]he nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their 
success must often depend on secrecy,”51 the Court concluded that the President, 
not Congress, is better equipped to make and execute foreign policy.52 
While the dispute in Curtiss-Wright did not compel the Court to decide 
whether the President or Congress had greater authority when they disagreed, 
this question did reach the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.53  
The issue in Youngstown concerned whether it was constitutional for President 
Truman to direct the Secretary of Commerce to seize steel mills in the midst of 
a labor dispute during the Korean war.54  The majority rejected President 
Truman’s argument that authority to seize the steel mills in order to evade a steel 
shortage in wartime was inherent in his Commander in Chief power under the 
Constitution, or in his executive vesting power.55  Instead, the majority reasoned 
that the authority must come from either an act of Congress, or from a specific 
provision of the Constitution.56  Because Congress had specifically rejected an 
amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act that would have allowed the President to 
seize the mills in the case of an emergency, the majority looked to authority in 
the Constitution, and concluded that it did not exist.57  As the majority noted, 
“the President’s power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the 
idea that he is to be a lawmaker.”58 
In his Youngstown concurrence, Justice Jackson focused his analysis on the 
relationship between the President’s action and the will of Congress, noting, 
“[p]residential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their 
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”59  Justice Jackson set out the 
following three categories, now referred to as the Steel Seizure Framework, to 
organize presidential authority along a spectrum: 
                                                 
 50. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 31921 (citation omitted).  For an analysis of Justice 
Marshall’s purpose in making this statement, and for criticism of Curtiss-Wright, see Fisher, The 
Staying Power, supra, note 49, at 150 (“In fact, the purpose of Marshall’s speech was to defend 
President John Adams for carrying out a treaty provision.  Nothing in Marshall’s sole-organ speech 
promoted or advocated independent presidential authority, yet Sutherland pressed that false 
doctrine.”) (emphasis added). 
 51. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (citation omitted). 
 52. See id.  See also KOH, supra note 19, at 95 (“[w]hile accepting the notion that the president 
should manage foreign policy—a tradition that had begun with Washington—the Curtiss-Wright 
opinion rejected the attendant condition of congressional consultation and participation.”). 
 53. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952). 
 54. Id. at 582–83. 
 55. Id. at 586–88. 
 56. Id. at 585. 
 57. Id. at 58587. 
 58. Id. at 587. 
 59. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).  See also KOH, supra note 19, at 108 (“Jackson’s 
Youngstown concurrence squarely rejected the Curtiss-Wright vision.”). 
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 1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it 
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress 
can delegate.  In these circumstances, . . . may he be said (for what it 
may be worth) to personify the federal sovereignty. . . . 
 2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant 
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent 
powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may 
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . . 
.  [C]ongressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may . . . enable, 
if not invite, . . . independent presidential responsibility. . . . 
 3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, 
for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus 
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.  Courts can 
sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by 
disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.60 
Reasoning that Congress’ rejection of the amendment allowing President 
Truman to seize steel mills meant his conduct was at odds with the will of 
Congress, Justice Jackson placed President Truman’s authority “at its lowest 
ebb” in this case, meaning he could only prevail under the framework with an 
affirmative grant under the Constitution.61  Justice Jackson then rejected 
arguments that the Article II vesting clause and the Commander in Chief clause 
gave him this authority, lamenting of a broad reading of the Commander in Chief 
power, “no doctrine . . . would seem . . . more sinister . . . than that a President 
whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is 
unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country 
by his own commitment of the Nation’s armed forces.”62  Moreover, Justice 
Jackson cited Congress’ authority under Article I “to raise and support Armies,” 
and “to provide and maintain a Navy “ as evidence of Congress’ greater war 
authority under the Constitution.63 
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Court applied Justice Jackson’s framework 
to the question of whether the President could “block[] the removal or transfer 
of ‘all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran,’” and 
suspend claims against a foreign country through executive orders under the 
Constitution.64  In its analysis, the majority remarked that presidential action is 
not always as clear as Justice Jackson’s framework might indicate.65  
                                                 
 60. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 63538 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 61. Id. at 637, 63941 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 641–42 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 643 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 64. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661–62, 669 (1981). 
 65. Id. at 669. 
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Nevertheless, the Court resolved the question of blocking property by explaining 
that Congress authorized the President to thwart transfers by enacting the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”)—thus placing the 
President’s action well within the Category One of the Steel Seizure 
framework.66  Recognizing that no statute authorized the President to suspend 
claims, the Court nevertheless refused to “ignore the general tenor of Congress’ 
legislation . . . in trying to determine whether the President is acting alone or at 
least with the acceptance of Congress.”67  Given the President’s generous 
authority under the statutes at issue, and “the history of congressional 
acquiescence in executive claims settlement,” the Court held that the President 
could suspend the claims.68 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court addressed whether the President possessed 
authority to detain an American citizen when a statute provided that no citizen 
could be detained “except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”69  Justice 
O’Connor’s plurality opinion concluded that the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force following the September 11, 2001 attacks was sufficient to permit 
the President to detain a United States citizen.70 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court addressed whether a detainee held at 
Guantanamo Bay, who the President declared was subject to trial by military 
commission, was entitled to the protections of an act of Congress: The Uniform 
Code of Military Justice.71  Though the Court recognized an independent power 
of the President to call military commissions, citing Youngstown, it reasoned that 
“he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its 
own war powers, placed on his powers,” and held that the military commission 
                                                 
 66. Id. at 670, 67275. 
 67. Id. at 678.  Koh notes of Justice Rehnquist’s majority’s three-part scheme of statutory 
construction, 
[R]ather than constru[ing] IEEPA’s silence regarding the suspension of claims as 
preempting the President’s claim of inherent power to act, [he] construed a history of 
unchecked executive practice, the fact of IEEPA’s existence, and the absence of express 
congressional disapproval of the President’s action to demonstrate that Congress had 
implicitly authorized the act, thereby elevating the President’s power from the twilight 
zone— Jackson’s category two— to its height in Jackson’s category one.  By so holding, 
he effectively followed the dissenting view in Youngstown, which had converted 
legislative silence into consent, thereby delegating to the President authority that 
Congress itself had arguably withheld. 
KOH, supra note 19, at 139. 
 68. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 65556, 686 (“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, 
but ‘long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption 
that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent.’” (citations omitted)). 
 69. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 51519 (2004) (plurality opinion) remanded by 378 
F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 2004), superseded by statute Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–
148, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005) as stated in Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 50 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 56872 (2006). 
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“lack[ed] power to proceed” because it did not comply with the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, among other applicable legal principles .72 
Zivotosfky v. Kerry presented a situation where the President’s authority was 
at its lowest ebb.73  The issue was whether a United States citizen born in 
Jerusalem was entitled to have Israel listed as the place of birth on a passport 
when an act of Congress provided that he was, but a State Department manual 
reflecting the President’s position provided that he was not.74  In 2002, Congress 
enacted the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which provides in pertinent 
part that “for purposes of the registration of birth, certification of nationality, or 
issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, 
the Secretary [of State] shall, . . . record the place of birth as Israel.”75  Though 
he signed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, President Bush noted that he 
considered this provision to infringe upon his constitutional powers, and that the 
United States position on Jerusalem’s status did not change with the law.76  
When President Truman recognized Israel in 1948, he did not consider 
Jerusalem to be within Israel’s sovereignty.77  Indeed, this had remained the 
position of each President since Truman’s recognition, and of the State 
Department.78 
Because the State Department’s practice of listing Jerusalem instead of Israel 
on passports was in tension with the express will of Congress as embodied in the 
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, the majority in Zivotofsky “examine[d] the 
Constitution’s text and structure, as well as precedent and history bearing on the 
question.”79  Ultimately, the Court found that the President’s power to “receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers”—which was understood as amounting 
to recognition power at the time of the Constitution—and which President 
Washington employed to recognize the French Revolutionary government—was 
an exclusive recognition power.80  In determining that this particular power was 
exclusive, the Court fortified its conclusion with the premise in Curtiss-Wright 
that the President alone could “make” treaties, and that diplomatic decisions and 
relations were ill-suited for congressional oversight.81 
                                                 
 72. Id. at 593 n.23, 613 (citation omitted). 
 73. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 10 (2015). 
 74. Id. at 57. 
 75. Id. at 7 (citation omitted). 
 76. Id. at 78 (citation omitted). 
 77. Id. at 6 (citation omitted). 
 78. Id. at 68 (citation omitted). 
 79. Id. at 67, 10. 
 80. Id. at 11–12, 15–16 (“[T]he Reception Clause received little attention at the Constitutional 
Convention . . . . In fact, during the ratification debates, Alexander Hamilton claimed that the power 
to receive ambassadors was ‘more a matter of dignity than of authority,’ a ministerial duty largely 
‘without consequence.’”) (citations omitted). 
 81. Id. at 1314, 17 (“A clear rule that the formal power to recognize a foreign government 
subsists in the President therefore serves a necessary purpose in diplomatic relations.”).  Despite 
the majority opinion’s apparent dismissal of Curtiss-Wright as dictum, “taking the Zivotofsky II 
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Despite concluding that recognition authority belonged to the President alone, 
the Court rejected any assertion that the President had “exclusive authority to 
conduct diplomatic relations,” and emphasized Congress’ role in foreign affairs, 
simply noting that recognition is only one part of overall foreign affairs 
authority.82  Nevertheless, the majority did not consider Congress’ naturalization 
authority under the Constitution to bear on this issue.83 
Although in Curtiss-Wright Justice Sutherland left open the possibility that a 
delegation by Congress to the President could be unconstitutional if it concerned 
domestic affairs,84 this has not remained the Supreme Court’s position.85  At 
issue in Federal Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., was whether 
Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act was an unconstitutional delegation 
of legislative authority to the President.86  Applying the intelligible principle test, 
the Court rejected the non-delegation challenge because the statute 
“establish[ed] clear preconditions to Presidential action, . . . the leeway that the 
statute gives the President . . . is far from unbounded, . . . [and because the 
statute] articulates a series of specific factors to be considered by the 
President.”87 
                                                 
majority opinion as a whole, this disavowal doth protects too much.  For much of the Court’s 
holding on the recognition power is built implicitly—and at one point even explicitly—on this 
broad language in Curtiss-Wright.”  Jean Galbraith, Zivotofsky v. Kerry and the Balance of Power, 
109 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 16, 18 (2016). 
 82. Zivotofsky, 576 U.S. at 16, 1920 (“It remains true, of course, that many decisions 
affecting foreign relations—including decisions that may determine the course of our relations with 
recognized countries—require congressional action.”) (citations omitted). 
 83. Id. at 33 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  In his dissent, Justice Scalia explained, “Congress’s 
power to ‘establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization,’ Art I, § 8, cl. 4, enables it to grant American 
citizenship to someone born abroad. . . . [This] enables Congress to furnish the people it makes 
citizens with papers verifying their citizenship—say a consular report of birth abroad.”  Id. at 69 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 84. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315 (1936). 
 85. The modern standard is the “intelligible principle’ test,” providing that “[s]o long as 
Congress ‘shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body 
authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not 
a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”  Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) 
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).  For a thorough 
overview of the intelligible principle doctrine and its limits, see Bryan Clerk, Comment, Refining 
the Nondelegation Doctrine in Light of Real ID Act Section 102(c): Time to Stop Bulldozing 
Constitutional Barriers for a Border Fence, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 851, 857–68 (2009). 
 86. Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 55859 (1976). 
 87. Id. at 55960.  The provisions of a trade statute provided, 
if the Secretary of the Treasury finds that an “article is being imported into the United 
States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national 
security,” the President is authorized to “take such action, and for such time, as he deems 
necessary to adjust the imports of [the] article and its derivatives so that . . . imports [of 
the article] will not threaten to impair the national security. 
Id. at 550. 
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C.  Past Practice 
1.  The Iran-Contra Affair – A Warning for the Future 
In 1986, a Lebanese newspaper revealed that the Reagan administration—
despite its statements to the contrary—had been selling arms to Iran in order to 
encourage the government to assist with release of American hostages held in 
Lebanon.88  Moreover, in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra Affair, the 
Reagan administration used the funds secured through these sales to support the 
Contras in Nicaragua.89  This conduct likely implicates Justice Jackson’s 
framework because Congress, through legislation in 1982 and the Boland 
Amendment of 1984, barred the President from providing assistance to the 
Contras.90 
An emphasis on individual wrongdoing in the reports of the Tower 
Commission, the House and Senate Select Committees and Independent 
Counsel, or the bodies charged with investigating Iran-Contra, produced little if 
any lessons for the future.91  While David J. Scheffer identified potential 
unlawful aspects of the Iran-Contra Affair under the AECA, he nevertheless 
concedes that the sales “fall[] into a legal quagmire because of the conflict 
                                                 
 88. GORDON SILVERSTEIN, IMBALANCE OF POWER: CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 146 (1997). 
 89. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 146. 
 90. FISHER, supra note 36, at 21415. 
 91. See KOH, supra note 19, at 1123 (“That focus [on the Affair’s anomaly] led the [Tower] 
Commissioners to reject the notion that the Iran-contra affair illustrated any need for legislative 
reform.”).  The Tower Commission Report “generally favored the presidency, even while laying 
the blame for the affair at the door of a specific President.”  KOH, supra note 19, at 16.  The 
committees also “virtually ignore[ed] the crucial legislative portion of their institutional mandate,” 
KOH, supra note 19, at 16, and though the Majority affirmed Congress’ shared role in foreign 
policy, it failed to “buttress[] its statements of constitutional principle with a comprehensive 
legislative program,” and “proffered only scattered recommendations for structural reform of the 
national security process.”  KOH, supra note 19, at 2021.  As for the independent counsel, while 
it obtained a conviction for Oliver North, the case evolved into “an ordinary criminal prosecution,” 
regarding, not foreign policy failures, but rather inquiries into “whether North has lied to Congress, 
[and] altered documents.”  KOH, supra note 19, at 23.  Koh does seem to articulate one lesson for 
the future in his statement that, 
the Iran-contra affair was only the tip of a much larger iceberg that crystalized during the 
Vietnam War. All of the congressional-executive struggles that surrounded the affair 
merely replicated battles that transpired during the earlier period.  That history should 
have repeated itself across so many spheres of foreign affairs, even after Congress had 
passed so many statutes to avoid repetition of the Vietnam-era evasions, suggests that the 
Iran-contra affair exposed systemic, rather than localized, problems in the American 
foreign-policy process. 
KOH, supra note 19, at 62.  If there is a lesson for the future, then, perhaps it is that Congress’ 
practice of delegation, and its failure to alter its practices after the Vietnam War and repeats such 
as Iran-Contra shows that Congress deserves primary culpability for the emergency waiver 
provision of the Arms Export Control Act. 
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between the laws governing the export of military arms and the laws governing 
cover activities.”92 
D.  The Arms Export Control Act’s Meaning and Requirements 
Congress enacted the AECA’s predecessor, the Foreign Military Sales Act in 
1968, in recognition of a “need for a consolidation and revision of the basic 
authority for the U.S. Government to sell military equipment abroad.”93  As 
Gordon Silverstein argues, the dawn of the Cold War and an era of nuclear 
weapons marked a change in Congress’ approach to war powers; it chose to 
delegate and “centralize authority.”94  The Foreign Military Sales Act’s 
legislative history makes clear Congress’ “concern that a 
large military sales program, unless it is carefully managed, may contribute to 
the development of regional arms races.”95 
While the initial Foreign Military Sales Act “required the Secretary of State 
to report ‘significant’ arms sales semiannually to Congress,”96 Congress sought 
to greatly expand its oversight powers through the 1974 Nelson-Bingham 
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.97  As Silverstein and others 
note, executive conduct and the Vietnam War prompted Congress to carve out a 
place in several foreign policy arenas.98  This particular amendment likely 
responded to President Nixon’s covert sale of weapons to the Shah of Iran in 
                                                 
 92. David J. Scheffer, Current Development: U.S. Law and the Iran-Contra Affair, 81 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 696, 698 (1987).  As David J. Sheffer noted, 
[C]urrent arms export . . . laws suffer from two glaring deficiencies.  First, there is no 
single standard in the law for (1) determining whether a state supports international 
terrorism; (2) identifying which U.S. official should make that determination; (3) 
identifying which arms are subject to restrictions; (4) identifying the criterial that 
empower the President to waive statutory restrictions; and (5) informing Congress of 
arms exports, including covert exports.  The law is riddled with overlapping standards 
that can lead to confusion and misuse. 
Id.  Although Scheffer identifies provisions of the AECA that the Affair likely violated, id. at 
699707, what does it say about the Act’s meaning and validity that violations do not have 
meaningful consequences?  Was it even illegal under the AECA?  See KOH, supra note 19, at 51 
(questioning whether covert sales are in fact illegal if the President justifies covert arms sales by 
using intelligence law frameworks). 
 93. S. REP. NO. 90-1632, at 4474 (1968). 
 94. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 123. 
 95. S. REP. NO. 90-1632, at 4474. 
 96. COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFS., WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: A SPECIAL STUDY OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, at 257 (1982) [hereinafter War Powers Resolution]. 
 97. The War Powers resolution became “the touchstone and model of other bills and 
resolutions aimed at similarly perceived problems,” the AECA Act among them.  War Powers 
Resolution, supra note 96, at 255.  Silverstein argues that the War Powers Resolution and 
subsequent laws based on that model are fundamentally flawed because Congress gives away or 
delegates its authority—even though it attempts to retain and restrict that authority—and in so 
doing, suggests that the executive take the initiative.  SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 139. 
 98. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 125. 
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1972, over objection of both the State and Defense Departments.99  Critically, 
Congress began to associate arms with diplomacy and foreign affairs more so 
than with trade, which also accounts for its renewed interest in the subject.100  
Like the War Powers Resolution, the Nelson-Bingham Amendment required that 
the Executive notify Congress before any proposed sale above a threshold 
amount, and provide a sufficiently detailed report on proposed sales.101  
Congress then possessed the authority under the Act to halt any such sales by 
concurrent resolution.102    
Congress attempted to pass more wide reaching legislation in the Ford 
Administration in 1974, in order to expand its authority.103  Failing to muster 
sufficient votes to override a presidential veto for an earlier version of the 
AECA, Congress and the President eventually agreed on and passed a now-
modified AECA in 1976.104  Although Congress originally inserted seven 
legislative veto provisions,105 the compromise eliminated most.106  Heralding 
human rights as an “area[] of deep concern to all Americans,” President Ford 
signed the bill despite his belief that the remaining concurrent resolution 
provision was “constitutionally objectionable.”107 
1.  Legislative Veto and its Demise – Yet Another Wake-Up Call? 
In INS v. Chadha, the United States Supreme Court concluded that a 
legislative veto not adhering to the “step-by-step, deliberate and deliberative 
process” of bicameralism and presentment in Article I § 7 of the United States 
Constitution, was unconstitutional.108  In the wake of this decision, Congress 
                                                 
 99. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons 
of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1266 (1988) [hereinafter Why the President (Almost) 
Always Wins]. 
 100. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 164. 
 101. War Powers Resolution, supra note 96, at 257. 
 102. Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins, supra note 99, at 1266. 
 103. Kevin P. Sheehan, Executive-Legislative Relations and the U.S. Arms Export Control 
Regime In the Post-Cold War Era, 33 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 179, 192–94 (1995). 
 104. Gerald R. Ford, Statement, President Signs Security Assistance and Arms Export Control 
Act (Jul. 1 1976), in LXXV THE DEP’T OF STATE BULL. 198, 198 (1986) [hereinafter Ford]. 
 105. 122 CONG. REC. 14,434 (daily ed. May 19, 1976) (statement of Rep. Morgan). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Ford, supra note 104, at 198.  Ford also stated, “My approval of H.R. 13680 will enable 
us to go forward with important programs in the Middle East, in Africa, and elsewhere . . . aimed 
at achieving our goal of international peace and stability.”  Id. at 199. 
 108. I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958–59 (1983).  See also KOH, supra note 19, at 143 
(“Chadha’s broadest impact in foreign affairs derives not from what it says the President may do, 
but from what it implies Congress may not do.”).  Koh argues that with respect to trade, Chadha 
did not diminish Congress’ role.  Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential 
Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v. Chadha, N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1191, 1233 (1986) 
(“[R]eports of the death of Congress’ role in international trade policymaking after Chadha have 
been greatly exaggerated.  If anything, the demise of the legislative veto has breathed new life into 
Congress’ determination to claim an active role in trade matters . . . .”).  Contra Timothy Meyer & 
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amended the AECA by replacing concurrent resolutions with joint resolutions, 
or the usual process of bicameralism and presentment.109  Though he notes that 
Congress has rarely invoked a joint resolution to prevent arms sales, Silverstein 
credits Congress with some success in oversight—reasoning that the legislative 
veto, and the prospect of a joint resolution after Chadha—send a message to the 
President to proceed with more caution in this arena.110  One interesting case 
study is President Reagan’s attempt to sell arms to none other than Saudi Arabia 
in 1986.111  After a majority in both houses of Congress voted in a joint 
resolution to prevent arms sales, the President modified the agreement to 
convince enough senators to sustain his presidential veto by only one vote.112 
E.  The Modern Law 
The current version of the AECA delegates to the President the ability to 
“control the import and the export of defense articles.”113  The Act permits such 
arms sales, transfers and leases “solely” for enumerated purposes such as: 
[I]nternal security, . . . legitimate self-defense, for preventing . . . the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . . permit the recipient country to 
participate in regional or collective arrangements or measures . . . requested by 
the United Nations for . . . international peace and security, or for . . . enabling 
foreign military forces in less developed . . . countries to . . . engage in other 
activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly 
countries.114 
F.  22 U.S.C. § 2776 – Requirements or Suggestions? 
22 U.S.C. § 2776 sets out the President’s reporting and consultation 
requirements with Congress under the AECA.115  In addition to providing 
periodic unclassified reports concerning letters of offer for defense 
equipment,116 the President must submit certifications to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of 
Representatives, and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of 
the Senate detailing the circumstances of a sale, either in the form of a 
government-to-government transfer or a commercial transfer in which case the 
                                                 
Ganesh Sitaraman, Trade and the Separation of Powers, 107 CAL. L. REV. 583, 610 (2019) 
(rejecting Koh’s premise because the reforms that replaced the legislative veto diminished 
Congress’ influence). 
 109. 132 CONG. REC. E3,175-03 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1986) (statement of Rep. Levine). 
 110. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 153. 
 111. Vanessa Patton Sciarra, Note, Congress and Arms Sales: Tapping the Potential of the 
Fast-Track Guarantee Procedure, 97 YALE L.J. 1439, 1448 (1988). 
 112. Id. 
 113. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1) (2018). 
 114. 22 U.S.C. § 2754 (2018). 
 115. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776 (2018). 
 116. See § 2776(a). 
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President issues a license to private companies.117  However, the President may 
waive waiting periods in which Congress has an opportunity to issue a joint 
resolution of disapproval to halt arms sales if he certifies that “an emergency 
exists.”118 
II.  ANALYSIS 
Saudi Arabia’s worsening reputation beginning with the Saudi-led Coalition’s 
record at home and in Yemen,119 and culminating in Jamal Khashoggi’s 
murder,120 seems to show that Congress taking a stand on arms sales with respect 
to Saudi Arabia is not beyond the realm of possibility.121  If enough members of 
Congress are persuaded to override a presidential veto, could the President still 
engage in the sales? 
                                                 
 117. See § 2776(c)(1). 
 118. 22 U.S.C. § 2776.  The waiver relevant to this dispute provides that the President must 
report to Congress unless he certifies that “an emergency exists which requires the proposed export 
in the national security interests of the United States.”  § 2776(c)(2).  The President must also 
provide a “detailed justification . . . including a description of the emergency circumstances.”  Id.  
The emergency provisions of the AECA originated as a product of negotiations between the Ford 
administration and Congress in 1974.  Christopher M. Blanchard, Jeremy M. Sharp & Clayton 
Thomas, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 7-5700, MEMORANDUM: EMERGENCY ARMS SALES TO THE MIDDLE 
EAST: CONTEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 9–10 (2019).  Citing concerns around how delays 
could affect relations with allies, President Ford rejected a proposal that would have allowed him 
to proceed with a sale for thirty days before seeking Congress’ approval—arguing  the October 
1973 war as an example of a situation where—if enemies knew the United States would stop 
providing arms after thirty days—the war might have escalated.  Id. (noting that Ford 
mischaracterized the thirty-day waiting period as it would not have resulted in an immediate and 
indefinite halt to sales). 
 119. Newton, supra note 3, at 11.  See also U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SAUDI ARABIA 2018 
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT  2 (2018), https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/SAUDI-ARABIA-2018-INTERNATIONAL-RELIGIOUS-FREEDOM-
REPORT.pdf (“Since 2004, Saudi Arabia has been designated as a ‘Country of Particular Concern’ 
(CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated 
particularly severe violations of religious freedom.”). 
 120. In October of 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a Saudi journalist who wrote for the Washington 
Post, was assassinated in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey.  Bill Hutchinson, Timeline of the 
Disappearance and Killing of Journalist Jamal Khashoggi, ABC NEWS (Dec. 12, 2018 9:59 AM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/International/timeline-disappearance-journalist-jamal-
khashoggi/story?id=58505659.  See also CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45046, CONGRESS AND THE WAR 
IN YEMEN, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing a senate resolution from December 2018 proclaiming 
that it was the sense of the Senate that the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, had ordered 
the killing). 
 121. See CONG. RSCH. SERV., CONGRESS AND THE WAR IN YEMEN, supra note 14, at 2–8 
(noting that when the coalition first emerged, providing arms was not controversial, and tracking 
the growing opposition to United States involvement in general, eventually culminating with the 
passage of a resolution consistent with the War Powers Resolution). 
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A.  The President’s Argument 
In suggesting that the President does possess authority to sell arms over 
Congress’ objection, advocates for a broad executive power might approach this 
question by arguing first that as in Dames & Moore and Hamdi, such action 
might not actually be the President at his lowest ebb under Justice Jackson’s 
Steel Seizure framework.122  Next, advocates might contend that even if the 
President is at his lowest ebb, the affirmative grants to the President under the 
Constitution would allow him to prevail.  A third argument might involve past 
practice. 
Advocates of a strong executive authority in foreign affairs would first look 
to the reasoning the United States Supreme Court in Dames & Moore, where the 
Court understood “the general tenor of Congress’ legislation” to authorize the 
President’s conduct though no statute expressly allowed it, thus shifting his 
status from a zone of twilight to his authority at its strongest.123  Advocates could 
also point to Hamdi, where O’Connor’s plurality reasoned that the AUMF 
allowed the President to ignore a statute that seemingly prevented his conduct 
as a further example of flexibility in Justice Jackson’s framework.124  Although 
in this case the AECA refuses to allow the President to sell arms if Congress 
passes a joint resolution preventing him,125 the President might suggest that the 
overall intent of the statute is to allow the President wide latitude because it is a 
delegation of the authority to control the sale of arms, and because of the 
emergency waiver provisions.126  Alternatively, he could contend that, pursuant 
to Hamdi, there is an unrelated congressional act that authorizes it.127  Not only 
is the President given the authority to take the initiative by arranging sales under 
the AECA, which only requires that he report and wait for Congress to approve 
them, the President also has the ability to waive these requirements by declaring 
that an emergency exists.128 
                                                 
 122. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38. (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 123. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981). 
 124. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517–19 (2004) (plurality opinion).  For a critique of 
O’Connor’s reasoning, see Sarah H. Cleveland, Wartime Security and Constitutional Liberty: 
Hamdi Meets Youngstown: Justice Jackson’s Wartime Security Jurisprudence And The Detention 
Of “Enemy Combatants”, 68 ALBANY L. REV. 1127, 1139 (2005) (“O’Connor’s preference for 
seeking congressional authorization . . . rather than deriving the authority from the President’s 
constitutional powers under Article II, is facially consistent with Jackson’s approach. . . . O’Connor 
failed to demand . . . clear congressional authorization that Jackson . . . required.  Her conclusion 
that the Court should broadly infer congressional approval . . . was contrary to Jackson’s . . . 
application . . . .”). 
 125. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(b)(1) (2018). 
 126. See id.  (requiring the President to report to Congress about sales, suggesting he conduct 
negotiations regarding sales). 
 127. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 51719 (2004) (plurality opinion).  An analysis of other statutes 
potentially supplying authority is beyond the scope of this comment. 
 128. One of these provisions provides: 
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In addition to the AECA itself, the President could point to the many foreign 
affairs statutes which also delegate Congress’ authority to the President, and 
suggest that, in aggregate, these statutes evince a “general tenor” of approval to 
executive action in the foreign affairs arena.129  Thus, the President’s authority 
is not in Category Three under Justice Jackson’s framework, but Category Two; 
and this zone of twilight is “likely to depend on the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”130 
Even if the President were to concede that selling arms to Saudi Arabia over 
congressional opposition would place his authority “at is lowest ebb” under 
Justice Jackson’s framework, the President could argue that he should prevail 
because of his affirmative grants under the Constitution.131  The President will 
first explain that Article II’s vesting clause, because it vests him with “the 
executive Power”132 as opposed to “all legislative Powers herein granted” 
inherently bestows to him more authority than Congress.133  Next, the President 
will argue that his Commander in Chief power of Article II supplies the authority 
to conduct arms sales because it concerns the realm of war, and these are arms 
sales to be used in war.134 
In the alternative, the President would contend that arms sales are now 
understood as mechanisms of diplomacy and treaty-like as opposed to trade and 
commerce.135  Under Curtiss-Wright, the President has greater authority in the 
realm of treaties than does Congress because he “makes” or negotiates them, a 
process over which Congress has no control.136  The President might also 
suggest that Congress’ authority is even less significant given the proliferation 
of executive agreements to which the United States is a party.137  As of 2008 the 
State Department provided data stating that the United States had entered into 
                                                 
If the President states in his certification that an emergency exists which requires the 
proposed export in the national security interests of the United States, thus waiving the 
requirements of subparagraphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph, he shall set forth in the 
certification a detailed justification for his determination, including a description of the 
emergency circumstances which necessitate the immediate issuance of the export license 
and a discussion of the national security interests involved. 
See, e.g., § 2776(c).  For a discussion of ambiguity or a possible drafting error in this provision of 
the AECA, see CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10304, WAIVER OF CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION 
PERIOD IN THE ARMS EXPORT CONTROL ACT 14 (2019). 
 129. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981); see SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 
123. 
 130. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 63438 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 131. Id. 
 132. U.S. CONST.  art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 134. U.S. CONST.  art. II, § 2 cl. 1. 
 135. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 88, at 159. 
 136. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 137. Hathaway, Presidential Power, supra note 15, at 149. 
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nearly 200 executive agreements with other nations, some with no congressional 
approval.138 
The President might also justify his conduct based on the Reception Clause.139  
As discussed in Zivotofsky and Curtiss-Wright, the President does possess 
considerable authority in diplomatic affairs because they often involve 
negotiation.140  Given that it was a dispute around the President’s authority over 
arms sales that convinced the Court in Curtiss-Wright to affirm the President as 
the “sole organ . . . in its external relations,” such autonomy extends to arms 
sales.141 
Last, the President might argue that past practice indicates he possesses 
authority to engage in arms sales over Congress’ opposition.  In addition to the 
tradition of sole executive agreements, the President could summon the Iran-
Contra Affair as an example of where the President both sold arms covertly—
without following the AECA’s directives—and avoided an act of Congress that 
sought to prevent the President from aiding the Contras.142 
B.  Congress’ Argument 
Advocates for a more restrained view of executive authority, or Congress, 
would argue that the imagined scenario is well within the Category Three of 
Justice Jackson’s framework, that the President must then have an affirmative 
grant from the Constitution minus any authority that Congress possesses, and 
that he does not.143  Nevertheless, the emergency waiver provisions, and the 
strong statements in Curtiss-Wright are a quandary, and not susceptible to easy 
answers. 
Congress would first contend that the President proceeding with arms sales 
over congressional opposition falls well within Justice Jackson’s Category 
Three.144  Unlike the case of Dames & Moore, where there was no express bar 
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 139. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 140. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1, 17 (2015); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 319. 
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 143. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
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 144. Id. at 63738 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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against the President’s conduct in some act of Congress,145 the AECA makes 
clear that the President may not proceed with the sale “if the Congress, within 
that [waiting] period, enacts a joint resolution prohibiting the proposed 
export.”146  Therefore, the “general tenor” of statutes in the foreign affairs arena 
are unnecessary to resolve the dispute because the AECA supplies a clear 
answer.147  With respect to the President’s argument that the existence of waivers 
suggests that the President was meant to have discretion under the AECA, the 
legislative history makes clear Congress’ intent that it also speak in arms 
sales.148 
Having established that this situation would render the President’s authority 
at its lowest ebb, Congress would argue that the President lacks authority to sell 
arms over Congress’ objection because Congress alone possesses it under the 
plain language of the Constitution.149  Here, Congress will point to the plain 
language of Article I, which grants it authority to “regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations,” making clear that Congress, and only Congress, has the power 
to regulate the sale of arms.150  According to Chief Justice Marshall, this power 
“relates to commerce, in the proper acceptation of the term: ‘the exchange of 
one thing for another; the interchange of commodities; trade or traffic.’”151  As 
arms are commodities and the AECA provides regulations for their exchange, 
the clause applies.152  Thus, the President in this case, like President Truman in 
Youngstown, would not prevail at the lowest ebb.153 
Despite the President’s argument that Iran-Contra shows he possesses 
authority to sell arms over Congress’ objection, there is other evidence 
suggesting the President and Congress have both thought that the AECA’s 
requirements are binding.  One example is President Reagan’s efforts to sell 
weapons to Saudi Arabia in 1986.154  In this circumstance, President Reagan 
knew that Congress opposed the sale, and he made concessions in order to sway 
enough votes to sustain his veto.155  Why would he have gone to the trouble if 
the law meant nothing?  Another instance of arms sales to Saudi Arabia 
                                                 
 145. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 681–82 (1981). 
 146. 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c)(2)(A) (2018). 
 147. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 678. 
 148. See War Powers Resolution, supra note 96, at 257–58 (quoting S. Rep 94-605) (noting 
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 149. See U.S. CONST.  art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 115 (1824). 
 152. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c) (2018). 
 153. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 633–34 (1954); Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 63738 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 154. Sciarra, supra note 111, at 1448. 
 155. Id. 
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illustrates the binding power of the AECA’s reporting and waiting period 
provisions.156  Two years earlier, in 1984, President Reagan reported to Congress 
a proposed sale in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war.157  After it seemed clear 
Congress would oppose the sale, President Reagan withdrew his proposal and 
invoked an emergency waiver provision instead.158  Again, it makes little logical 
sense for a President to follow a law if he or she believes that it is not binding. 
C.  The Troubling Presence of the Emergency Waiver Provisions 
The emergency waiver provisions in § 2776 of the AECA complicate the 
analysis.  Because the legislative history seems to make clear that the executive 
should have broad discretion under the emergency clauses, the President could 
argue that the “general tenor” of the AECA itself is to offer him wide 
discretion.159  Although President Reagan’s move to inform Congress of a sale 
pursuant to a non-emergency, and then invoke an emergency when Congress 
disapproved, suggests he thought the non-emergency requirements of the AECA 
did bind him at some level,160 this episode also illustrates that requirements are 
effectively meaningless if the President can discharge them by declaring an 
emergency.  More important, are there any limits? 
Under the Steel Seizure analysis then, could the President’s conduct ever 
reside in Category Three if he invokes the emergency provision?161  Even if 
Congress attempted to pass a law specifically prohibiting his sale, is the 
President not acting pursuant to the emergency waiver provision, which allows 
him to ignore Congress in the case of an emergency? 
III.  COMMENT – TIME TO RECONSIDER CURTISS-WRIGHT? 
According to UNICEF, “Yemen is the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, 
with more than 24 million people—some 80 per cent of the population—in need 
of humanitarian assistance, including more than 12 million children.”162  Famine 
conditions and an outbreak of cholera also contribute to the suffering of the 
Yemeni people.163  Experts in a recent United Nations Human Rights Council 
report cite a number of airstrikes the Saudi-led Coalition undertook that killed 
civilians—among them—the August 2018 strike on a bus in Sa’dah, a March 
2019 attack on a busy hospital that killed eight civilians, and four airstrikes in 
                                                 
 156. See 22 U.S.C. § 2776(c) (2018). 
 157. Blanchard, Sharp & Thomas, supra note 118, at 13. 
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 159. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678 (1981); § 2776(b)(1). 
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 161. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 63738 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
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Al-Hundaydah that resulted in deaths and injuries.164  Based on the results of 
these airstrikes, the experts concluded this pattern of attack might not comport 
with international humanitarian law.165 
In his report for the American Bar Association, Newton concludes that, 
assuming human rights reports are reasonably accurate, there is sufficient 
evidence to suggest that “the government of Saudi Arabia has engaged in a 
consistent pattern of gross human rights violations in Saudi Arabia[,]”166 and 
“prima facie evidence of [a] consistent pattern of flagrant denials of the right to 
life, namely, serious violations of the prohibition on indiscriminate or 
disproportionate acts.”167 
Should Congress seek to halt arms sales under the AECA, and garner enough 
support to override a presidential veto, the President should not then be able to 
proceed with the sale.  By the same token, Congress should not possess 
unlimited authority to halt or execute arms sales either.  This view is fully 
consistent with the plain language of the Constitution and Justice Jackson’s Steel 
Seizure Framework.  The particular case of Yemen illustrates the importance of 
arms sales, and many related policy decisions.  One branch possessing authority 
to circumvent another sets a dangerous precedent.  Unfortunately, the emergency 
waiver provisions of the AECA, together with the dictum in Curtiss-Wright 
make this result less certain. 
Unlike in Curtiss-Wright and Dames & Moore, the AECA would likely bar 
the President from proceeding with a sale in the absence of an emergency.168  
Although the President’s conduct seemed to be at odds with the statute in Hamdi, 
Justice O’Connor’s plurality reasoned that the AUMF, another act of Congress, 
authorized it.169  Not only is there not another act of Congress present in this 
case, but also the United States is not a member in the Saudi-led coalition.170  It 
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is therefore conduct “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress,” and in Category Three under Justice Jackson’s framework.171 
As a result of disastrous commercial transactions between the states and 
foreign nations under the Articles of Confederation, “there was widespread 
agreement that Congress should regulate at least some aspects of foreign 
commerce.”172  Indeed, the framers did just that, granting Congress the authority 
“to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”173  Under Chief Justice 
Marshall’s definition of commerce as an “interchange of commodities,” sales of 
arms for money likely qualifies.174  There is no doubt that the President has 
authority in both the treaty clause and the recognition clause to conduct 
diplomacy.175  It is also true that arms sales are a mechanism of diplomacy and 
war, an identity they arguably assumed rather recently.176  Like many 
constitutional issues, perhaps the answer is that arms sales fall into a number of 
categories. 
Even if the President were to cast these sales as within his Commander in 
Chief power,  Youngstown suggests that the Commander in Chief power does 
not confer universal authority because Truman was a wartime President and the 
Court still managed to find that he did not possess authority to seize the steel 
mills.177  Likewise, in Hamdan, the President’s constitutional authority did not 
permit him to deny rights to a detainee when an act of Congress demanded it.178  
Even if arms sales are more akin to foreign affairs than commerce, Congress 
also has significant authority “[t]o declare War, grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Capture on Land and Water[,]”179 “[t]o 
raise and support Armies,”180 “[t]o provide and maintain a Navy,”181 “[t]o make 
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces,”182 and 
“[t]o provide for calling forth the Militia to . . . suppress Insurrections and repel 
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Invasions.”183  Because the United Nations and Newton suggest Saudi Arabia 
may not have complied with international humanitarian law, Congress’ authority 
to “define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations” is highly relevant 
in this case.184  Moreover, if the President benefits from inherent authority 
through his Commander in Chief or vesting power, Justice Jackson’s framework 
would be meaningless.  Under Justice Jackson’s framework then, it seems likely 
that the President would not possess authority to sell arms over Congress’ 
opposition. 
The analysis presented above considers the requirements of the AECA in the 
absence of an emergency waiver, and in many respects, Curtiss-Wright.  The 
existence of these emergency waivers—together with their broad 
interpretation—complicate the analysis under Justice Jackson’s framework.185  
Because they are interpreted so broadly,186 they both suggest that Congress 
intended to give the President wide latitude and deference, and also essentially 
make optional the requirements of the AECA.187  After all, President Reagan 
invoked the waiver after it seemed clear Congress would oppose his arms sale.188  
A proposed solution would be for courts to construe this emergency waiver 
provision more strictly because any other interpretation might be an 
unconstitutional delegation.  Unlike the statute at issue in Algonquin, the 
emergency waiver provision here depends on the President’s own determination, 
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and not on that of “clear preconditions,” meaning that the President is free to 
proceed with a sale as long as he provides a justification, and there are no factors 
or definitions to guide the President’s determination that an emergency exists.189  
While advocates for the President may point to guiding purposes articulated in 
the AECA as sufficient to constitute an intelligible principle, there should be 
cause for concern from a non-delegation perspective that, unlike in Algonquin, 
there appear to be no limits on the President’s ability to declare anything an 
emergency.190  In fact, this very scenario bears a resemblance to Justice 
Jackson’s fears about the “sinister” prospect of a President invoking the 
Commander in Chief power in order to extend his authority.191 
As discussed in Section II, despite the Court in Zivotofsky’s protests that many 
of the statements about executive authority made in Curtiss-Wright were mere 
dicta, it does seem clear that Curtiss-Wright influenced the Court’s holding.192  
Curtiss-Wright was also an appeal from a criminal conviction, meaning the 
Court allowed Congress to delegate to the President authority to make and 
enforce a criminal law.193  This proposition seems highly problematic from a 
constitutional perspective.194  Not only does Curtiss-Wright appear contrary to 
the framer’s intent to separate foreign affairs powers by dividing them among 
the executive and legislative branches, it would also seem to preclude the 
holding in Youngstown because President Truman justified his conduct based on 
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war powers.195  Given the Constitution and Justice Jackson’s framework’s 
endurance, Curtiss-Wright’s dubious contentions likely deserve further scrutiny. 
Not only would a result that the President lacks the authority to disregard a 
joint resolution opposing arms sales be consistent with the Constitution and 
Justice Jackson’s framework, it is good policy.  Leaving aside the 
unconscionable suffering of the Yemeni people to which the United States 
contributes, deals between the executive or Congress alone are often less 
advantageous because there is no pressure to secure a better deal, and negotiating 
partners are well aware if a branch is not accountable to others.196  In this 
particular case, as Newton warns, there is “cause for concern that the United 
States’ ongoing support of the Saudi-led coalition may provoke more violent 
extremism in the long term in light of the highly questionable patterns of attacks 
affecting the civilian population.”197  This problem of rash decision-making 
evincing questionable results is not new.198  Arms sales are only part of the larger 
foreign policy framework, but they matter.  Arms sales matter to the parents who 
lost their children in the August 2018 airstrike.199  They should not be the domain 
of one unaccountable branch. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
With the strong language of the AECA, it is hard to understand why time and 
time again, the United States seems to supply arms that cause suffering to 
civilians.  While it is easy to blame the President in the case of a covert arms 
sale, Congress is equally culpable for delegating authority in the first instance, 
and declining to reign in the President’s conduct once it lost use of a legislative 
veto not subject to the presidential veto.200  At the same time, maybe Congress 
believes that the President should have discretion to act quickly on arms sales 
given the complex and evolving nature of foreign affairs matters.  Perhaps courts 
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should undertake their duty of impartial judicial review.  Arms sales are not 
merely diplomatic tools.  They have consequences, as the present conflict in 
Yemen demonstrates.  Justice Jackson’s framework is a clear mechanism for 
resolving conflicts between the President and Congress, and the Courts should 
employ it more in the interest of the Constitution, national security, and 
humanity. 
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